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I am very honoured to be asked to make a review of Professor Kent Jones’ monograph 
“Reconstructing the World Trade Organization for the 21st Century – An Institutional 
Approach”.1 One can ask whether it is fair that a scholar who approaches the WTO from a legal 
and constitutional perspective should review a book by a distinguished professor of economics 
who offers an institutional analysis from a constructivist perspective with its focus on both 
formal and informal rules. It is my belief that a review by a legal and constitutional scholar is 
justified. If one takes an open mind towards other disciplines and accepts that each discipline 
is confined within its own assumptions, new learning and understanding of the shared subject; 
here the WTO, will appear. Through interdisciplinary approaches we learn more about our own 
disciplines in a wider context. I find the book by Professor Jones most welcoming. It is 
interesting, thought-provoking and inspiring, and it triggers some interdisciplinary questions 
which I will address later in this review.  
The book offers a reconstruction of the WTO in light of the failure of the Doha Round. The 
author starts with the fundamental question in the introduction; “Why isn’t there more trade?”.2 
The outset for the analysis is that the WTO has institutional problems which have caused the 
failure of the Doha Round. Professor Jones compares the initial ambitious Doha plan and the 
single undertaking agenda with the outcome of the Doha Round to establish “failure”. 
Professor Jones makes a clear delimitation. It is an institutionalist approach, not legal, political, 
economic or sociological. By institutionalist analysis the author considers “why the WTO 
exists as an organization, and the process by which its members collectively agree on pursuing 
its goals. It seeks to clarify both formal and informal rules regarding the rights and obligations 
of members, negotiations, and decision-making. It identifies what policy areas are allowable 
for bargaining, how the process of consensus starts, and how it ends.”3 The assumption is that 
there are gains to be achieved from trade, and that the WTO fundamentally aims at increasing 
global trade. If there is lack of trade, it is because of institutional failures.  
The book is divided into an introduction and 8 chapters. The introduction largely links trade 
with institutions and explains the basic premise that lack of trade is a result of shortcomings in 
institutions. The introduction also briefly explains that the Doha Round aimed at expanding 
global trade and market access.  
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Chapter 1 is the “Doha Round – What Went Wrong and What is at Stake?”. As the title 
suggests, Professor Jones provides an overview of the factors contributing to the failures of the 
Doha Round. That is later elaborated on in the book. Those factors are categorized into 5 
overlapping institutional problems; 1) conflict with the limits of policy sovereignty; 2) the 
single undertaking principle; 3) special and differential treatment for developing countries 
without clear outline of the reciprocity in trade negotiations; 4) change in the balance of powers 
between OECD and non-OECD countries; and 5) dispute settlement reforms with stronger 
judicialization increased the stakes of liberalization commitments. Chapter 1 then provides the 
structure of the book before discussing what is at stake if the institutional setting is not 
improved. Professor Jones gives some examples of trade barriers that should be overcome in 
order to explore the new gains from trade before Professor Jones gives some examples of 
increased protectionist policies by the WTO Members during the financial crisis where WTO 
Members to some extent found loopholes in the WTO system. Professor Jones suggests the 
importance of further trade liberalization and introduction of new disciplines and rules.  
Chapter 2, “Institutional Foundations of the GATT/WTO System” examines “the GATT/WTO 
system as an international institution: a set of rules and processes established by its members 
to regulate trade relations and trade liberalization with each other.”4 Professor Jones takes a 
constructivist approach where he in particular relies on the work by John R. Searle5 who 
emphasises “a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment 
of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and 
deontic powers”,6 and that society has a logical structure. Professor Jones will later  provide a 
short critique of the spontaneous order suggested by Friedrich A. Hayek in Road to Serfdom.7 
Professor Jones explains the historical evolvement of trade policy as an institution where trade 
provides mutually beneficial gains for parties involved and with reference to Douglas North, 
Professor Jones establishes his measurement for the success of GATT/WTO; “the desired goal 
of institutions as providing a framework to reduce transaction costs and increase total economic 
efficiency and welfare”.8 The collective intentionality of GATT/WTO is the aim of reducing 
transaction costs of trade liberalization and respecting participants’ economic autonomy. That 
aim is validated by a shared belief of the participants and it will altogether provide the 
institutional equilibrium if the participants move together towards that aim in their activities. 
That institutional equilibrium seems to be achieved in the GATT era with multilateral trade 
liberalization, monitoring of the trade rules, and dispute settlement. 
Chapter 3, “The GATT to WTO Transition and Institutional Crisis in the Doha Round”, 
concerns disruption of the institutional equilibrium. The chapter addresses the institutional 
challenges with the move to the WTO and with the Doha Round. More specifically, Professor 
Jones identifies the single undertaking rule; the introduction of TRIPS, the increased 
judicialization of the Dispute Settlement; China as new member; changed bargaining power, 
in particular with stronger bargaining power of developing countries; and regional integration 
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as institutional shocks which have caused disruption in the institutional equilibrium. Chapter 3 
also provides some overall suggestions for solutions to overcome the institutional problems. 
Chapters 4-8 focus in more depth on the institutional problems identified in chapter 3 and 
provide possible remedies. Chapter 4, “Impediments to Doha Round Consensus and the Search 
for WTO Solutions” concerns both the formal and informal decision-making structures of the 
WTO with focus on problems in the negotiating environment and asymmetric bargaining 
power in the consensus based organization. Chapter 5, “WTO Governance and Committee 
Chair Representations” focuses on the institutional structure of decision-making in WTO 
Committees with focus on appointments of committee chairs and their influence on agendas. 
Chapter 6, “Regional vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization” addresses regional trade 
agreements (RTA) and the question asked is whether they “play a useful role in moving global 
trade talks forward, and even toward multilateral agreement”.9 As the Doha Round has not 
delivered, RTAs are trade liberalization alternatives which many states are involved with. 
Some RTAs, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, may potentially play a role in reviving multilateralism at WTO level although they 
have limits as they do not include some major global players, like China and India. Chapter 7, 
“Trade, Embedded Liberalism, and Development” focuses on the political balance between 
states favouring expanded trade opportunities and states favouring stability and particular 
national economic goals. Professor Jones discusses the concept “embedded liberalism” and 
how it can be renewed in order to make it relevant for both developed and developing countries.  
Chapter 8, “Pathways Back to Geneva” is the final chapter where Professor Jones compares 
WTO multilateral trade negotiation with a high-stake poker game to illustrate the problem 
when all players have to gain from it and at the same time make consensus. As those problems 
are illustrated in the Doha Round, Professor Jones provides some alternative institutional 
models, including RTAs. However, Professor Jones provides a number of arguments why the 
multilateral trading system still is preferable. For example, the increase of RTAs may increase 
fragmentation. Professor Jones also recommends that leadership should be taken. Not only by 
the traditional GATT leaders, but also by some of the new strong actors like China, India and 
Brazil, and they must seek some consensus together with the US and Europe. The Bali 
Agreement was a small achievement of the Doha Agenda but also exposed the constraints on 
the WTO in its current state for negotiating future multilateral agreements. Professor Jones 
offers here some different pathways which can take the participants back to WTO 
multilateralism. Professor Jones concludes by addressing his opening question and answers; 
“Why there isn’t more trade”.10 He briefly provides recommendations; WTO Members must 
keep their WTO engagement active; stick to trade issues, and not environmental, human rights, 
and labour standards, for the sake of collective intentionality apart from those already existing 
in for example GATT exceptions;11 improve the WTO decision-making procedures; use RTAs 
to eventually move over to WTO multilateral level; and improve domestic adjustment policies 
and business engagement.   
The book gives this legal scholar, who mostly will focus on formal rules of international law; 
i.e. treaties, customary law, and principles of law, a much broader perspective on the WTO and 
an understanding that there is an important and very powerful world of informal rules and 
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structures which are decisive in the governance of the WTO. For example, it triggers a number 
of constitutional questions concerning the roles of the Director General, The Councils, the 
Ministerial Conference, The Dispute Settlement Body and various Committees and questions 
concerning the relationship between those actors as well as the WTO as a whole and the scope 
of sovereignty of the WTO Members in their relationship with the WTO as well as the 
constitutional and legal relationship between RTAs and the WTO. The separation between 
formal and informal rules are not necessarily easy to make, and a too narrow, legalistic 
approach may turn into a utopian framework detached from an institutional reality. On the other 
hand, the legal and constitutional approach opens up for some questions to the institutional 
approach. For example, Professor Jones suggests that the multilateral trading system should be 
sticking to the old trade issues but rightly observes that there are links between trade and non-
trade values.12 The question is whether WTO Dispute Settlement can keep a narrow trade focus 
as they must interpret the WTO treaties by using customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. It can be asked the role human rights, environment, labour protection etc. 
have – or should have – in the interpretation of WTO treaties as the WTO treaties cannot be 
seen in a vacuum but must be understood in light of public international law.13 If a state has 
obligations under public international law, the multilateral trade agreements cannot override 
those other obligations. Thus it is important for negotiators of multilateral trade agreements to 
have in mind those other obligations their respective states have beyond the trade obligations 
when they negotiate new trade agreements or amendments to the existing ones. It could be 
interesting if Professor Jones at one point would take the institutional approach towards some 
of the other international organizations and discuss whether there is room for institutional 
improvement in their interrelationship and whether a “collective intentionality” can be sought 
among them, like between the WTO and the International Labour Organization and their 
respective organs and their members. Public international law offers sadly only limited 
guidance here and perhaps the institutional approach to it could provide an interesting platform 
for discussion when the legal and constitutional dimensions in this puzzle of international 
organizations – although all bound under the UN Charter – is debated and attempted to be 
established by lawyers. 
I will highly recommend this book. Both as inspiration for potential changes to the existing 
institutional framework of the WTO as well as basis for discussion of not only economists but 
also for lawyers, political scientists and trade negotiators from the respective WTO Members. 
Henrik Andersen 
Senior Lecturer, Lancashire Law School – University of Central Lancashire, United Kingdom 
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